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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
The relevant undisputed facts for review were stipulated
to at the pretrial and trial motions to suppress the evidence
and were corroborated at the trial by the testimony of the
officers themselves.

Therefore, there is no need nor useful

purpose to cite the record in support of those facts.

And those

facts alone are sufficient to hold that the searches and seizures
in this case were unreasonable.

The other facts referred to in

the respondent's brief as not being cited in the record may be
ignored as surplusage.
The labeled security checks for other victims or suspects
inside the residence beyond the front porch and front door were
pretextual and did not fall within any exigent circumstances
exception to the search warrant requirement, because they were
conducted beyond the immediate scene of the shooting which
occurred outside the residence from the front porch to where the
victim was standing in the front doorway.
The later searches and seizures with a search warrant
were also pretextual, poisoned by the initial warrantless searches
and seizures, and not conducted according to proper procedure.
Therefore, both searches and seizures, with or without
a search warrant were unreasonable, causing the evidence to be
suppressed.
ARGUMENT OF THE CASE
POINT I
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CITATIONS TO THE RECORD ARE NOT
NECESSARY WITHIN THE STATEMENT OF
THE RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW
WITHIN APPELLANT'S BRIEF UNLESS
FACTS STATED ARE DISPUTED.
The statement of facts in respondent's brief does not
contain all the facts stipulated to at the pretrial motion to
suppress.

At that hearing defense counsel suggested stipulated

facts to avoid the necessity of witnesses.
Judge Billings then stated, "All right.

Do you want to

recite them in your version?"
In answer to that question, the prosecutor stated his
version of the facts.

(In. 17, R. 213-In. 11, R. 216):

Mr. Ybarra: Your Honor, if it please
the court I believe I am prepared to
recite what those facts are.
Your Honor, at approximately 7:34 on the
14th day of April, 1986, the police
received a notification of a shooting at
a location here in Salt Lake City. There
were three police officers of the sheriff's
department, Kirk Jensen, Scott Bell and-Kirk Jensen, Craig Carroll and Kent Davis
who arrived approximately simultaneously
a few minutes after the call-in.
Judge Billings: There was Mr. Jensen,
Davis, and who was the third?
Mr. Ybarra:

Carroll, C-A-R-R-O-L-L.

Judge Billings:

Ok.

Mr. Ybarra: Upon arriving at the scene
they noted that there were approximately
ten emergency medical technicians that
were working on a victim lying in the
driveway. They were notified by emergency
medical technicians the body had been
moved a few feet from where it was found
-2-

in the driveway beside a van or a
truck.
Kirk Jensen, Deputy Kirk Jensen, found
an unexpended cartridge next to where
the body was lying. He took initial
control of the scene asking Deputy
Craig Carroll to take the defendant,
who's present at the scene, into the
house to find out what her story was,
what was going on, what had happened.
He discovered from her that that morning
that her boyfrined with whom she was
living with her child, in the house in
question, had received a knock at the
door. The boyfriend had responded to
the knock, there was heard a thud.
The boyfriend left the apartment, chased
after an assailant who had shot him in
the chest, returned to the apartment,
and loudly and insistently cried out he
had been shot and asked for an ambulance
to be called.
The defendant, Michelle Pursifull, at
that time took a few minutes, called
the ambulance and went outside where
her boyfriend had gone out, out of the
duplex and had fallen down to the pavement
of the driveway.
Shortly thereafter the E.M.T.'s arrived,
the three sheriff's officers arrived and
shortly thereafter other members of the
Salt Lake City Police Department arrived.
Those names are unknown. And there are
several other sheriff's officers and
homocide (sic) detectives who arrived.
Among them are Deputy Bell, a Deputy
Thompson, a Deputy Judd, a Lieutenant Forbes,
who took charge of areas, various portions
of the crime scene.
Lieutenant Forbes was in charge and assigned
out several of the deputies to perform
certain tasks, among them being the diagram
of the exterior and the interior of the
premises and of making an oral description
on a tape recorder of the crime scene.
-3-

Now, one of the uniformed police
officers and sheriff deputies that
arrived was a Deputy Lynn Wardle. Now,
he arrived before the homocide (sic)
investigators did. And as part of
securing the scene that was begun by
Deputy Jensen, Deputy Carroll, Deputy Bell,
he assisted in securing the scene by
entering the premises to determine
whether or not there were any persons
present and whether there was any persons
injured or if there were any other
exigent circumstances that needed to be
taken care of before the homocide (sic)
detectives arrived.
When the homocide (sic) detectives arrived
Deputy Wardle pointed out to Detective
Thompson that in a linen closet next to
the master bedroom he had discovered what
appeared to be three bales of marijuana.
They were not seized at that time.
Based upon that information the narcotics
division were called in. Based upon this
information they obtained a search warrant
and went back, searched the premises,
seized the bales of marijuana as well as
numerous other drugs and drug paraphenalia.
And it's my understanding the drugs, the
bales of marijuana, and the drug paraphenalia,
is the basis of the motion to suppress at
this time.
In answer to the very same question, and immediately
following the prosecutor's version of the stipulated facts, the
defense counsel stated his version of the stipulated facts.
(In. 12, R. 216-In. 10, R. 217):
Mr. Hansen; Our contention is, Your Honor,
that we go along with their version of the
facts, so I don't think it would be necessary
to call any witnesses. But our contention is
in supplementary to his facts that as the
knock on the door caused the deceased to go
out to answer it, there was this crash, and
he was shot by someone standing on the porch
-4-

in the doorway. And then Mrs. Pursifull,
who was living with the victim at the
time in the premises, though not married,
ran out to see. She got up on the bed,
looked out the window and saw somebody
running down the street. She goes into
the front room and sees her boyfriend and
he says "I've been shot, Babe,11 and he
points down to his chest and he falls into
a rocking chair and sends her to get some
help.
She went back in the bedroom, called 911
and came back out. He wasn't anywheres
near the front door or the rocking chair.
She went outside looking for him and he
is underneath a truck outside. She took
him from underneath the truck, laid him
in her arms, the police came, and then
she put the head down on the ground, waived
the police where she was. They came and
took her inside. They didn't ask for
consent. They didn't have a warrant. And
they did not make an arrest so it was not
a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The only point is that the state contends
that there was (sic) exigent circumstances.
There was no objection to the stipulated facts so far
as the prosecutor stated his version.

Nor was there any objection

to the supplementary facts as stated in the defense counsel's
version of the stipulated facts.
Consequently, the stipulated facts were undisputed and
required no citations to the record.
POINT II
THE SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT CONDUCTED IN
THIS CASE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE
SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
Perhaps we should resort to fundamental definitions of
the word "exigent" for us to better understand what is meant by
-5-

the phrase "exigent circumstances."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines
the word "exigent1' (1) : requiring immediate aid or action (2) :
requiring or calling for much:

Demanding....

Webster's New World Dictionary (1984) defines the word
"exigent":

(1): calling for immediate action or attention;

urgent; critical (2): requiring more than reasonable; demanding;
exacting.
Webster's New World Thesaurus (1971) defines the word
"exigent":

(1): [Urgent] - Syn. pressing, critical, imperative;

see urgent 1. wherein many synonyms are given, e.g. indispensible,
demanded, essential, paramount, vital, crucial, instant, overruling, foremost, not to be delayed.

Ant., untimely.

In the case of State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court held at 267:
[1] Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution, and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
In order for a search to be constitutionally
permissible, a search warrant issued by a
neutral magistrate and based upon probable
cause is required. There are, however,
several exceptions to the warrant requirement.
These include a limited search incident to
a lawful arrest;(5) search of an automobile
based on probable cause that it contains
contraband;(6) and seizure of evidence in
plain view by one with a lawful right to be
in a position to so observe it. (7)
(Citations omitted.)
The above exigent circumstances exceptions do not include
a warrantless search of the inside of a residence when the
-6-

shooting of the victim occurred from outside of the residence
from the front porch to the front doorway where the victim was
standing at the time he was shot and went outside, leaving a
trail of blood from the front doorway, on the front porch, and
on the outside driveway where he died after the suspect left
the scene by running down the street.
It is believed that there are no Utah cases which
include the circumstances of this case within the exigent exceptions
to the search warrant requirement, even if the officers were
acting in good faith with the purpose being to look for other
victims or suspects within the residence.
§78-16-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1982,
provides:
In establishing the provisions of
this chapter it is the intent of the
legislature to create an effective
statutory remedy and deterrent for
violation by peace officers and other
governmental employees of the civil
rights of the citizens of this state
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah. This remedy
shall stand in lieu of the exclusion of
evidence in criminal cases for violation
of the constitutionally protected rights
except where those violations are substantial and peace officers were not
acting in good faith.
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court very, very recently
(State v. Mendieta and Mendoza, Sup. Ct. Case No. 20922, decided
December 1, 1987) held this statute to be unconstitutional under
-7-

the United States Constitution by its allowing a court to accept
possibly tainted evidence if the evidence was obtained by peace
officers in good faith.
POINT III
THE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, WITH OR
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT, CONDUCTED
IN THIS CASE WERE PRETEXTUAL AND NOT
CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO PROPER
PROCEDURES.
Again, perhaps we should resort to fundamental definitions, this time for us to better understand what is meant by
the word "pretext."
Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines
the word "pretext":

to weave in front:

a purpose or motive

alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real
intention or state of affairs.
Webster's New World Dictionary (1984) defines the word
"pretext":

1. a false reason or motive put forth to hide the real

one; excuse 2. a cover-up; front.
Webster's New World Thesaurus (1971) gives as synonyms:
appearance, guise; see pretense 1.

Examples of synonyms for the

word "pretense" include insincerity, smoke screen, excuse.
Officer Wardle responded to the 7:34 call to supervise
securing the scene (R.251).

He was asked on cross examination:

... you weren't very sincere about
security reasons in searching without
a search warrant, were you?
(Emphasis added.)
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He answered:
No, sir.

(R. 251).

Officer Wardle testified that he went inside the residence for the purposes of security reasons (R. 251), to determine whether or not other people were in there as possible victims
or possible suspects.

(R. 251). He searched the front room,

the upstairs, kitchen, bedrooms, and bathroom area.

(R. 248).

He opened a closet door directly in front of a bedroom door
(R. 248) which appeared to be a linen closet (R. 249) and found
what appeared to be three large bundles of marijuana.

(R. 250).

He then went outside and informed Detective Forbes, who is over
homicide, what he had found and contacted the narcotics division.
He remained at the scene but did not participate in the subsequent
search,

(R. 250). He did not search the basement.

Other

officers were in the basement at the same time he was searching
upstairs (R. 252), before the search warrant.

(R. 251).

The officers arrived shortly after 7:30.
The search warrant was executed at about 10:25.

(R. 247).

(R. 263).

Marijuana was also found in the hallway in the basement.
(R. 369). And marijuana and drugs were strewn throughout the
house.

(R. 282, 293).
The other officers who were downstairs were still in

the residence when Officer Wardle went outside.

(R. 252). There

is no evidence that they left the residence before the yellow
ribbon, which was wrapped around the house to secure the area,
-9-

had been taken down around 3:00.

(R. 263). In other words,

there is no evidence that the officers in the basement did not
remain within the residence for approximately three hours between
the time of their entry until the search warrant was executed,
and for approximately another four and one-half hours from the
time the search warrant was executed until they left the area
around 3:00.
Surely, it would not seem reasonable that it required
three hours for a warrantless search of the inside of the residence
to search forpossible other victims or possible suspects, when
it took four and one-half hours to search the inside of the
residence for drugs.

This is especially significant because Ms.

Pursifull had told Officer Judd the suspect had run down the
street and had never been inside the house. (R. 504).
If the officers were in fact in fear of the safety of
the public, Ms. Pursifull, and themselves, why would they take
her inside the residence shortly after they arrived so that she
could calm down and tell them what had happened about the shooting?
Shortly after the other officers had taken Ms. Pursifull
inside the residence, Officer Judd took her downtown to the Hall
of Justice to further interrogate her about the shooting.

(R. 374)

Almost all of the interrogation at the Hall of Justice
was about drugs.

Officer Judd told her that he had received

many calls from the officers at her residence and that it was a
dope dealer's paradise, a dope dealer's den.
-10-

(R. 377).

The burden of proof is on the officers to establish
any exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a
search warrant.
In the Hygh case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held
at 268 that fundamental constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them what
they are not.
CONCLUSION
The searches and seizures, with or without a search
warrant, within the facts of this case were mislabeled.

They

were not exigent circumstances exceptions to the requirement of a
search warrant.

There was no true security search for other

victims or suspects.
were pretextual.
warrant.

Both the before and after warrant searches

There was no probable cause for the search

The officers had already searched the residence.

They

awaited the search warrant to make the seizures seem lawful, when
in fact they were not.
An example of this contention is the fact that the three
large bundles of marijuana were removed by someone from the closet
to the living room in between the time Officer Wardle shut the
door and Officers Sharp and Anderson executed the warrant.

(R. 266,

R. 343).
Another example of this contention is the fact that
the other officers brought the evidence from the basement to the
living room upstairs where Officer Sharp was executing the search
-11-

warrant.

(R. 293).
Proper procedure was followed by not citing the record

when stipulated facts were not disputed by either party.
The evidence seized should have been suppressed and
the case dismissed.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT 4
| Unreasonable searches and seizures.!
The right o! the people lo be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and ellects, against unreasonable searches and icuures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or atUrmation, and part
icularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized

AMENDMENT 14
tectiua I. ICIiUcaaMp - Due process of law • Lquiil
prolcttioft |
Sttiiom 1, IKeprcataiaUve* • Power to reduce
appoiAimcal I
becttoa 3. UMM|UAUfk»tioa lo told oltkr |
betlioa 4. |PMOMC dctH •<>( lo be i|tfte»<i»«e«l Dcbil» of Ifct
C oafederBry • • d chums mot lo be paid 1
becUoa S. (Power lo enforce »meadmeal.|

Section 1. ICltizenthip - Due process of law Lqual protection.!
All persons born or naturalized in tht United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United Stale* and of the State
wherein they reside No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens ot the United States, nor shall any
Slate deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, not deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection ot Uws

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Section 14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden Issuance of warrant.|
The right ot the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and elfects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
it*

UTAH STATUTES

§78-16-1,

U.C.A.

1953 (amend.

1982):

71-14-1 L«ii«iatt«r iitiral • MrimtJy l« lieu of
t&tluMoa ul cvtacmc la tiia&iaal v»»c*.
In e>t*Muhui|| the jMuviviunv ul Uu» ihttfttri il t&
the intent ol the »cgi»Uiufc iu CICMIC «it cllcUivc
MAluloiy cemedy *nJ dcicircni I of violation) by
pc«cc O I I K C I I and uihcr govriitiiicnul employee* of
the civil ftghu ol the tiit/cn* ol «lit» suite gu^r^ntecU by the I otif ill mid I ounccmh Amciulmciiife lo
the Untied b u i c i ( oiutiiuttoii uitil A n k l e I, bcuion
14 o( the Coiuiitution ul Utah. I hu rtnicUy *Ji*ll
Mfifful lit lieu ol the {Aiiuteon (»t rveUciKC tit m i l total
t.4*c» lot viuUiiDit. ol the ioit<kiiiuit«4ii*!tl]p niotc&led
f i g h t * C«wC|/t *ll«.lC ttu»>C VtOUiUHh 4IC \ut>*lailtull
ftfUi | W « U ollltClft WCfC II04 t t l l l l g lllgOtMl l A l l h
l«tl

